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MAY YOU LIVE IN INTERESTING TIMES: PATENT LAW IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
SETH P. WAXMAN1 
“May You Live In Interesting Times” is a proverbial “ancient Chinese 
curse” that is, by all accounts, neither ancient nor Chinese.2 Whatever its 
provenance, the concept of living in “interesting times” aptly describes the 
situation in which lawyers, scholars, businesspeople, and inventors find 
themselves with respect to patent law. I’ll explore today just what has made 
these times so interesting, particularly the major trends and themes that have 
emerged from the Supreme Court’s involvement over the past decade. You 
can then conclude yourselves whether it is a curse—or an opportunity—to 
live in such interesting times. 
1.  The pace of developments alone makes this period interesting. It can 
sometimes feel like everything around us is accelerating. It took almost seven 
decades to fill the 999 volumes of F.2d; it is expected that F.3d will be full 
in less than half that time. And while emerging patent jurisprudence might 
not match the intensity of a 24-hour cable news channel, in the life of the 
law, it is more than doing its part in producing new developments. This is 
not just perception or an explosion in commentary, but rather genuine change 
with real-world consequences for our economy. 
The pace of change is driven not just by case law, but by Congress as 
well. We are less than a decade from passage of the America Invents Act, 
the most extensive overhaul of the patent system in half a century.3 The AIA 
shifted to a first-inventor-to-file system, greatly expanded post-grant review 
in the Patent Office, and made other changes big and small. Practitioners 
now operate under two legal regimes, depending on a patent’s filing date, 
with the courts yet to decide many questions relating to the new regime. 
We are also less than a decade from enactment of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA).4 Years in the making, the BPCIA 
created an abbreviated pathway for approval of biosimilar drugs and a new 
 
 1.  Partner, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr. This is the text of a lecture Mr. Waxman 
delivered at Chicago-Kent School of Law on September 28, 2017. Much credit for the lecture goes to 
Thomas A. Saunders, also a partner at Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr.  
 2.  THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 669 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006). 
 3.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 4.  Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 804 (2010). 
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mechanism for resolving related patent disputes. To date, only seven licenses 
have been approved under the BPCIA.5  Companies are still feeling their way 
through the new system, and many issues of interpretation lie ahead. The 
Federal Circuit, borrowing from Winston Churchill, described the opaque 
structure of the BPCIA as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”6 
Into this mix, add the Supreme Court. The Court’s docket has shrunk 
since the early 1980s, when the Court heard over 150 cases each Term.  Now-
adays, the Court renders decisions in about half that number.7 Yet over this 
period of decline, the number of patent cases on the Court’s docket has in-
creased markedly. 
By my count, using some judgment as to what qualifies as a patent case, 
the Supreme Court has decided 50 patent cases in the more than 30 years 
since the Federal Circuit was created,8 and it already has two on the docket 
 
 5.  Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,  List of Licensed Biological Products with (1) Ref-
erence Product Exclusivity and (2) Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations to Date, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMNIN., (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalPro-
cess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBiologicApplications/Bi-
osimilars/UCM560162.pdf. 
 6.  Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1371 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 7.  In the Term immediately past, by my count, the Court issued decisions in 62 argued cases and 
in seven cases without argument. 
 8.  Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017); Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017); 
SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017); Life Techs. 
Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016); 
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. 
Ct. 1923 (2016); Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401(2015); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco 
Sys., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Alice Corp. 
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2120 (2014); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); FTC 
v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2107 (2013); Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278 (2013); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013); 
Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431 (2012); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399 
(2012); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i 
Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 
563 U.S. 776 (2011); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593 (2010); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); MedImmune, 
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); 
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 193 (2005); Holmes Grp, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826 (2002); Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000); Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 
U.S. 150 (1999); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. 
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Cardinal Chem. Co. 
v. Morton Int’l, 508 U.S. 83 (1993); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Bonito 
Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 
U.S. 800 (1988); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986); GM Corp. v. Devex Corp., 
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for this coming Term.9 While not all this activity has been clustered in the 
last few years, there has been a noticeable uptick. In the 23 years between 
1983 and its eBay decision in 2006, the Supreme Court decided 17 patent 
cases. In the 11 years since eBay, it decided 33. That is roughly a fourfold 
increase in the rate of patent decisions. We have now seen Terms, including 
this past one, in which patent cases accounted for nearly 10 percent of the 
Court’s entire docket. Considering the panoramic breadth of federal law, that 
is a lot of attention to patents. 
What explains this marked increase? Let me suggest a few factors. 
First, the Supreme Court’s increased interest in patent law tracks the 
rising importance of intellectual property in our society. As industrial man-
ufacturing in the U.S. economy has declined, ideas have increasingly become 
our country’s economic lifeblood. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) has estimated that between 2010 and 2014 “the share of total U.S. 
GDP attributable to IP-intensive industries increased” by 10 percent, “from 
34.8 percent in 2010 to 38.2 percent in 2014.”10 Apple’s supply chain may 
stretch around the world, but its packaging says “Designed by Apple in Cal-
ifornia.”11 The Supreme Court seems to appreciate the reality that we live in 
an innovative economy, and the rules that shape the protection and owner-
ship of inventions are critically important. 
Second, the economic importance of intellectual property has created a 
litigation environment in which companies are willing to make the invest-
ment required to take a case all the way to the Supreme Court. As formal 
trials become rarer across the spectrum, patent cases are the notable excep-
tion, and the monetary stakes that support that type of commitment also en-
courage parties to stick it out on appeal. Litigants have long known that the 
high reversal rate in the Federal Circuit gives trial losers a decent shot at 
relief on appeal. And increasingly litigants are thinking beyond the first level 
 
461 U.S. 648 (1983). 
 
Note that some of the “patent” cases on this list did not arise from the Federal Circuit because they in-
volved other areas of law, such as antitrust or breach of contract, that intersect with patent law.  Also, I 
included GM Corp., which arose from the Sixth Circuit, because it was decided by the Supreme Court 
after the Federal Circuit was created. However, I did not include Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 
556 U.S. 635 (2009), which although it began life as a patent case, reached the Court in a follow-on case 
brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  
 9.  Oil States Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017); SAS 
Institute, Inc. v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017). 
 10.  U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: 
2016 UPDATE 22 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEcono-
mySept2016.pdf. 
 11  Designed by Apple in California, APPLE.COM, https://www.apple.com/designed-by-apple/ (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2017) 
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of appellate review. The Supreme Court’s interest in patent law has created 
a feedback loop in which parties begin to think earlier and more strategically 
about what issues they might take to the Supreme Court. That increases the 
pool of quality cert. petitions, often championed by specialist Supreme Court 
counsel, which in turn encourages the Court to take more cases. 
Third, every doctrinal change the Supreme Court makes creates ripples 
that produce new questions that need to be answered. If a two-part test with 
objective and subjective components is not right for attorneys’ fees, why 
continue to use such a test for enhanced damages?12 If laches is not a defense 
to copyright damages, does the same rule apply in patent law?13 If § 101 is 
not as easy to satisfy as it once seemed, what are the limits on patent-eligible 
subject matter? 
Fourth, legislative change naturally produces its own interpretative 
questions, which tend to reach the Court after a lag of five to ten years. The 
Court heard its first BPCIA case in 2017.14 It first interpreted the AIA di-
rectly in 2016, and both cases on the Court’s docket this coming Term relate 
to the AIA.15 Several more cases involving these statutes are likely in the 
offing. 
Fifth, for better or worse, a narrative seems to have taken hold at the 
Supreme Court that the work of the Federal Circuit requires close scrutiny. 
A high reversal rate in cases from the Federal Circuit is to be expected. The 
national reach of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction means that if the Supreme 
Court is satisfied with the result below, it need do nothing to ensure national 
uniformity. One, therefore, expects that the Supreme Court would consider 
whether it agrees with the result reached by the Federal Circuit and would 
be disproportionately inclined to grant in cases where its initial instinct is to 
reverse. 
What I am talking about goes beyond the simple scorecard of wins and 
losses. It is a matter of the Court’s overall impression of the state of patent 
law and its confidence leaving the law’s development in the hands of others. 
On that intangible level, there has been a considerable shift. 
The Court’s skepticism found an early voice in Justice Kennedy’s con-
curring opinion in eBay v. MercExchange. Writing for four Justices, he ob-
served: “An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis 
 
 12.  Compare Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, with Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. 1923. 
 13.  Compare Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), with SCA Hygiene 
Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. 954. 
 14.  Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017). 
 15.  See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016); see also Oil States Energy 
Servs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 
2160 (2017). 
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for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licens-
ing fees.”16 These companies, he warned, use injunctions as a “bargaining 
tool to charge exorbitant fees” and “the threat of an injunction is employed 
simply for undue leverage in negotiations.”17 The narrative of the abusive 
non-practicing entity had found its first foothold in the Court. 
Soon the Court turned a skeptical eye on the institutions that had puta-
tively allowed the patent system to slip into this state of affairs. At oral ar-
gument in KSR v. Teleflex, the lawyer arguing for Teleflex observed that the 
major patent bar associations supported his position. Chief Justice Roberts 
famously shot back “which way does that cut? That just indicates that this is 
profitable for the patent bar.”18 
Justices have also expressed skepticism about the PTO’s performance 
of its gatekeeping function. At the oral argument in Association for Molecu-
lar Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Justice Kagan remarked that “the PTO 
seems very patent happy.”19 Justices have also mused openly about the pre-
sumption of validity given the high rate at which patents are invalidated in 
litigation. At the argument in Commil v. Cisco Systems, Chief Justice Roberts 
elicited the fact that invalidity is found for 40 percent of patents that are 
challenged—an important caveat since companies can be expected dispro-
portionately to challenge patents they perceive as weak.20 He then said: “So 
only 60 percent are upheld. That’s not much of a presumption of validity.”21 
Perhaps most outspoken on patent law issues has been Justice Breyer. 
At the argument in Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics, he remarked: “To-
day’s patent world is not a steam-engine world. We have decided to patent 
tens of thousands of software products and similar things where hardly any-
one knows what the patent’s really about.”22 He said: “I think it’s unfortunate 
that Congress hasn’t passed a special regime for those kinds of patents . . . . 
We’re seeing more and more companies that have more and more, and con-
tinuously more patents.”23 
 
 16.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Transcript of Oral Arg. at 41, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 548 U.S. 938 (2006) (No. 04-
1350). 
 19.  Transcript of Oral Arg. at 53, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 
576 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
 20.   Transcript of Oral Arg. at 4, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) 
(No. 13-896). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Transcript of Oral Arg. at 10, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) 
(No. 14-1513). 
 23.  Id. at 33. 
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These general impressions that something is not right in the state of pa-
tent law seem to have contributed over time to a greater willingness to sec-
ond-guess the Federal Circuit. Whatever instinct the Court may once have 
had to tread cautiously in reviewing the work of the nation’s patent-expert 
court of appeals has clearly disappeared. 
This new mindset has, in some ways, transformed the Federal Circuit’s 
national jurisdiction from an asset into a liability. Generally, the existence of 
a circuit split is the best predictor of Supreme Court review. The unique na-
ture of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction makes a split less likely, although 
not impossible.24 While this may initially have eased pressure on the Su-
preme Court to review Federal Circuit decisions, now the opposite appears 
true. The absence of a split has become the chief talking point in many pa-
tent-law cert. petitions, which trumpet the fact that the Federal Circuit has 
set a national rule that will govern all patent cases unless and until the Su-
preme Court intervenes. It is hard to dismiss such a petition as warranting 
“further percolation.” Instead, the Court is encouraged to look at the merits 
and decide—often amid the din created by a chorus of sky-is-falling amicus 
briefs—whether it is comfortable letting the Federal Circuit’s decision stand 
without a closer look. 
All these factors make it likely that, for the foreseeable future, we will 
see a steady stream of new patent decisions coming from the Supreme Court. 
I hope that, going forward, the Court will take stock of the substantial 
changes it has already wrought and their effect as it considers further adjust-
ments. At heart, patent law is about achieving balance. The various doctrines 
should work together to encourage an optimal level of innovation and dis-
closure without suppressing competition more than necessary. It can be hard 
enough to maintain that balance when discrete changes are made one at a 
time. But when you are changing five, ten, or fifteen things in a short time, 
the risk of confusion and miscalculation greatly increases. 
The Court’s limited access to information exacerbates the problem. Its 
impressions of how patent law functions in practice are more likely to be 
shaped by the statements in amicus briefs than by any direct experience. 
Those briefs often tell the same story in case after case. Some warn of patent 
thickets, non-practicing entities, and endless demand letters. Others tout the 
role of strong patents in fostering innovation. The briefs then connect these 
 
 24.  On issues touching on civil procedure, the need for Supreme Court review is typically predi-
cated upon the contention that the Federal Circuit is applying a rule contrary to sister circuits. See, e.g., 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23–24, Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 
(2014); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).  
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general narratives to the case at hand, urging the Court to adjust or maintain 
this doctrine or that one to push the patent system in the desired direction. 
The question the Court needs to ask itself is whether these descriptions 
remain accurate, and specifically whether they account for changes the Court 
has already made. If the Court is really hearing about the way things were 
five or ten years ago, then it is receiving an inaccurate picture. The reality is 
that the pace of change has been so rapid that no one knows the full effect of 
the Court’s decisions so far or the further impact that decisions already on 
the books will have going forward. 
One solution would be for the Court to pause for a time and let the 
changes it has already made sink in. I am not optimistic we will see such a 
pause, but it would give time for the system to adjust and provide space for 
the reflection needed to prevent mistakes. 
2. Beyond the sheer number of cases is the nature of the changes being 
made. A consistent theme in the Supreme Court’s recent patent decisions is 
an aversion to rigid rules. KSR rejected the teaching-suggestion-motivation 
test in favor of an “expansive and flexible approach” to obviousness.25 Oc-
tane Fitness criticized the Federal Circuit’s attorneys’ fees decisions for 
abandoning a “holistic, equitable approach in favor of a more rigid and me-
chanical formulation.”26 It held that “no precise rule or formula” governs the 
determination whether a case “stands out from others,” which must be made 
based on a “case-by-case exercise of . . . discretion, considering the totality 
of the circumstances.”27 Halo Electronics replaced “the inelastic constraints” 
of the Federal Circuit’s two-part test28 with an egregiousness standard.29 
Nowhere is the Court’s aversion to rigid rules more evident than in its 
approach to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. In Bilski v. Kappos, 
the Court seems to have come close to categorically holding that methods of 
doing business are not patentable.30 Justice Steven’s lengthy concurrence for 
four Justices reads like it was originally written to be a majority opinion.31 
 
 25.  550 U.S. at 415. 
 26.  Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1754 (2014). 
 27.  Id. at 1756. 
 28.  Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016). 
 29.  Id. at 1932. 
 30.  See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 31.  There was a seven-month gap between argument and decision. Justice Scalia, who appears to 
have been the swing vote, joined parts of two different opinions. And two years later, Justice Scalia said 
that his “hardest decision” while on the Supreme Court “would probably be a patent case”—although he 
unfairly added that “it’s the dullest case imaginable.” Piers Morgan Tonight, CNN (July 18, 2012, 
9:00PM), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1207/18/pmt.01.html. 
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But after failing to adopt a bright-line rule on business-method patents, 
the Court embraced its admonition against adopting rigid rules with a venge-
ance in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.32 and 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank.33 The two-step analysis that has emerged from 
those cases has led to invalidation of many patents. But I suspect that if you 
got most judges or litigators alone and off the record, they would admit that 
they don’t really understand what the framework means or how to apply it. 
Consider the Supreme Court’s description in Mayo of the second step 
of the analysis. After saying that a claim must “do significantly more than 
simply describe” natural correlations, the Court said: “To put the matter more 
precisely, do the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correla-
tions to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible pro-
cesses that apply natural laws?”34 If determining whether the claims add 
“enough” is the “more precise[]” formulation, one trembles to think of the 
less precise version. 
The tension between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court reflects 
the age-old debate about rules and standards. The Federal Circuit has tradi-
tionally been more inclined to adopt rules. It was created, after all, for the 
purpose of bringing stability and predictability to the law; and being closer 
to the front lines, it has a better sense of the practical consequences of unclear 
guidance. The Supreme Court, by contrast, has a high tolerance for uncer-
tainty. It regularly grapples with abstract concepts that defy easy application, 
such as “due process” and “equal protection.” It tends to hear cases precisely 
because there is no clear answer, or at least enough uncertainty to split the 
lower courts. And as the Supreme Court largely controls its own docket, it 
does not bear the consequences of uncertainty as directly as other courts that 
have to find room on crowded dockets to adjudicate routine cases. 
Perhaps the pendulum will swing back one day. In other areas of statu-
tory interpretation, the Court has shown considerably more openness to ad-
ministrable rules. For example, in a 2011 employment law case, the Court 
rejected a “murky” rule in favor of one that could be “readily applied,” with 
the outcome in many cases “known even before litigation is commenced.”35 
But for now, in the field of patent law, counsel must be prepared to advise 
clients amid the uncertainty of multi-factor tests. This requires a great deal 
of judgment, especially when a client asks for the dreaded percentage—the 
 
 32.  See 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012). 
 33.  134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 34.  Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 77. 
 35.  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2449 (2013). 
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reduction of a complex legal question, as applied to a complex set of facts, 
into a single number predicting the likelihood of success. 
I have profound respect for the common-law method of adjudication—
especially in the constitutional context. Common-law adjudication allows 
the law to evolve to meet new situations and to make fine-grained distinc-
tions from case to case. But in the patent area, where companies must often 
make investment decisions years in advance, the Supreme Court’s aversion 
to bright-line rules brings to mind Jeremy Bentham’s criticism of the com-
mon law. Bentham quipped that judges make common law “as a man makes 
laws for his dog,” by waiting until it does something wrong and then 
“beat[ing] him for it.”36 That metaphor may resonate with a client that 
guesses wrong about how a multi-factor test will be applied, only to learn 
the correct answer upon being told it must face the consequences. 
3. Another hallmark of the Supreme Court’s recent patent decisions has 
been their lopsided nature. I find it puzzling and somewhat troubling that the 
Court regularly decides difficult patent cases with near unanimity. In the 
eight patent cases decided in 2016–2017, there were only three dissents com-
manding a total of only four votes.37 A robust dissent can make the majority 
opinion much sharper. Without that internal check, soft spots in the major-
ity’s reasoning are less likely to be rectified. Altogether, the Court’s opinions 
in the four patent cases I argued last Term fill only 29 pages of the Supreme 
Court Reports, and the vast majority of those pages simply recited the rele-
vant facts and legal principles.38 
4. One reason for this phenomenon is the Supreme Court’s seeming de-
valuation of context. Overwhelmingly, what matters to the Court are its own 
cases and the express statutory text. Those are, of course, plainly important. 
But the Patent Act is notably not a comprehensive statement of patent law.39 
Many patent doctrines, arising from tort and equity, are not included in the 
 
 36.  Jeremy Bentham, Truth Versus Ashhurst, in WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 233, 235 (1843). 
 37.  Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1538–39 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); SCA Hygiene Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 967–73 (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148–56 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 38.  See Sandoz, Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. 
First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 
734 (2017); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S Ct. 429 (2016). 
 39.  Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 (1997) (“In the context 
of infringement, . . . pre-1952 precedent survived the passage of the 1952 Act.”); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923 
(1952), at 10’ (specifying defenses only “in general terms”). 
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text at all.40 And consistently over decades lower courts recognized that.  Of-
ten, the Supreme Court pays no heed. 
Relatedly, the Court has been increasingly dismissive of the expecta-
tions created by congressional action that considered settled patent case law 
and left it intact. As recently as 2011, the Court devoted a section of its opin-
ion in Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership to the fact that Congress had left 
the Federal Circuit’s decisions requiring clear and convincing evidence of 
invalidity intact. The Court wrote: 
 
For nearly 30 years, the Federal Circuit has interpreted 
§ 282 as we do today. During this period, Congress has often 
amended § 282; not once, so far as we (and Microsoft) are 
aware, has it even considered a proposal to lower the stand-
ard of proof. Moreover, Congress has amended the patent 
laws to account for concerns about “bad” patents, including 
by expanding the reexamination process to provide for inter 
partes proceedings. Through it all, the evidentiary standard 
adopted in § 282 has gone untouched.41 
 
Subsequent decisions have made clear, however, that this mode of anal-
ysis carries little or no weight. Consider the Court’s decision to relax the 
standard for enhanced damages in Halo Electronics. The Federal Circuit’s 
two-part Seagate standard,42 requiring both objective baselessness and sub-
jective willfulness, did not have as long a pedigree as the clear-and-convinc-
ing standard for proving invalidity. But the lopsided en banc decision in 
Seagate was the law at the critical time Congress was working on the AIA. 
And the legislative history makes clear that Congress relied on Seagate and 
expected it to remain the law with no need for Congress to take further ac-
tion.”43 Against this backdrop, Congress opted to make only a technical 
 
 40.  Among others, the list includes equitable estoppel, unclean hands, prosecution laches, and the 
doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
53, 70–71 (1993) (additional examples). 
 41.  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Lim. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 113 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 42.  In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (2007). 
 43.  The House Report favorably cited Seagate for the proposition that “willful infringement re-
quires at least a demonstration of objectively reckless behavior.” H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39 n.9 
(2011). Both the Chair of the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet 
and the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee stated the courts had satisfactorily resolved several 
issues in patent law, “including . . . willfulness.” Crossing the Finish Line on Patent Reform: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet, 112th Cong. 18, 1 (2011) 
(“Since we began debating comprehensive patent reform over a half decade ago, the Federal courts have 
issued numerous opinions that have touched on some of the very reforms we have been working on, 
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amendment to § 284, with no change to the language regarding enhanced 
damages.44 It also enacted a separate provision regarding what evidence 
could be used to show willfulness.45 An amicus brief filed by the named 
sponsors of the AIA emphasized that “[i]n declining to amend Section 284’s 
enhancement provision, Congress understood that Seagate would remain in 
place and continue to govern the enhancement analysis under Section 284.”46 
The Court dismissed such arguments with little discussion. The lesson 
for Congress, and for practitioners advising clients, is to take nothing for 
granted. No matter how clearly or often the Federal Circuit has applied a 
legal principle, you need to ask whether the Supreme Court itself has adopted 
that rule.  If not, things might soon look different. 
The Court’s recent decision on laches drives this lesson home. Lower 
courts sitting in both law and equity had applied the doctrine of laches to 
limit patent damages for well over a hundred years. As one scholar observed, 
“[m]uch of the overall body of patent jurisprudence was developed within 
the equity framework,” and patent law is suffused with “equitable ap-
proaches to judicial reasoning and lawmaking.”47 Every court of appeals to 
consider the question before the Patent Act of 1952 had agreed that laches 
can bar damages—a fact Congress undoubtedly understood when it broadly 
codified existing defenses, including the defense of “unenforceability,” “in 
any action.” Again after 1952, the courts of appeals were unanimous that 
laches can bar damages. 
No doubt in part for that reason, the Supreme Court had never taken up 
the issue. But when it did last Term, this reticence proved regrettably dispos-
itive. Speaking summarily and nearly unanimously in SCA Hygiene v. First 
Quality Baby Products, the Court held that laches is no defense to a patent 
 
including . . . willfulness.”); Review of Recent Judicial Decisions on Patent Law: Hearing Before H. Sub-
Comm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet, 112th Cong. 14, 2 (2011) (“[I]if the courts 
sufficiently have addressed an area of patent reform, then that may obviate the need for the Congress to 
act.”); Id. at 3 (“[T]he courts have helped us . . . in ferreting out a lot of issues that we can take mostly off 
the table,” including “willfulness.”). Witnesses at the latter hearing echoed this sentiment.  One noted that 
“[t]he low standard for proof of willfulness, which results in the imposition of multiple damages” had 
been “the subject of a lot of the Committee’s deliberations,” but “w[as] over-turned by the Federal Circuit 
in the . . . Seagate decision[].”). Id. at 14 (testimony of Andrew J. Pincus, Mayer Brown LLP).  Another 
witness noted that certain decision had “gone the way that the legislation was headed,” and cited the 
Federal Circuit’s limitation of enhanced damages as an example.  Id. at 31–32 (testimony of Dennis 
Crouch, Assoc. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Missouri). 
 44.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub L. No. 112-29, § 20(j)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 335 (2011). 
 45.  35 U.S.C. § 298 provides that failure to “obtain the advice of counsel with respect to any alleged 
patent infringement . . . may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed.” 
 46.  Brief of Certain Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Resp’ts at 7, Halo Elecs., 
Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., S. Ct. Jan. 20, 2016 (No. 14-1513). 
 47.  Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848, 913 (2016). 
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damages claim.48 The Court looked to isolated dicta in non-patent cases of 
its own reciting that laches generally does not bar damages. The Court said 
it “need not address whether it is ever reasonable to assume that Congress 
legislated against the background of a lower court consensus rather than the 
contrary decisions of this Court.”49 
Creation of the Federal Circuit was certainly not meant to eclipse the 
Supreme Court’s ultimate authority in patent cases. But once enough years 
have passed without Supreme Court review, considerations of stability and 
certainty counsel against making sudden changes in patent doctrine. This is 
particularly true where Congress or the courts have made other adjustments 
against the backdrop of what appeared to be settled law. Justice Brandeis 
famously observed that “in most matters it is more important that the appli-
cable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”50 This observation 
applies with extra force in patent law, where uncertainty can upset the incen-
tives for investment as readily as a bad rule. 
The Supreme Court clearly understands this point when it comes to its 
own precedent. In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, it noted that in patent 
law, as with property more generally, “considerations favoring stare decisis 
are ‘at their acme.’”51 While stare decisis does not bind a higher court re-
viewing the work of a lower court, many of the same considerations that 
would have the Supreme Court defer to a decision made by an entirely dif-
ferent set of Justices 100 years ago counsel in favor of treading lightly when 
another court with national jurisdiction has consistently applied a rule for 
decades. 
To be clear, I am not calling for the Supreme Court to abjure consider-
ation of long-settled doctrine. I am suggesting that given the Supreme 
Court’s control over the cases it hears and the frequency with which Con-
gress has made adjustments to patent law, the Court should heed its own 
admonition that “courts must be cautious before adopting changes that dis-
rupt the settled expectations of the inventing community.”52 Otherwise, the 
Court may find that the uncertainty engendered by the impression that seem-
ingly any doctrine can be undone at any time outweighs the benefit from any 
specific changes the Court might make. 
 
 
 48.  137 S. Ct. 954 (2017).  
 49.  Id. at 954 n.5. 
 50.  Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 51.  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 240, 2410 (2015). 
 52.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002). 
